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droit national. Je vous trouve aussi trop rapidement sc!Wre pour Ie vocabulaire
Jure imperii, jure gestionis, et pour les «actes de nature commerciale • : Ie
vrai probl~me est peut~tre d'eclairer ce vocabulaire par des c standards • d~
ves. Mais de toutes fa~ns, a moins de proceder par assertions dogmatiques,
nous sommes condamnes a formuler des directives assez souples, que ron
propose ces directives comme des regles de droit international public, OIl
comme des regles de droit uniforme.
Permettez-moi pour Ie moment de ne pas repondre dans Ie detail A votre
questionnaire; je Ie ferai volontiers un peu plus tard, oralement ou par ecrtL
Croyez-moi, mon cher Confrere, votre tout devoue
Paul Reuter

8. Observations of Mr Sompong Sucharitkul
2S April 1986

1. I agree with the Rapporteur that the words .. recent aspects" in the
mandate of the Commission should be interpreted with a certain liberality with
sufficient latitude for the Rapporteur to investigate the root causes of all the
current problems relating to jurisdictional immunities. The Rapporteur should
have a wide discretion to determine the precise extent of the .. aspects" that
should be covered in his report whether or not they are still considered to be
of recent development.
2. The distinction between immunities ratione personae and immunities
ratione materiae has served a practical and useful purpose in a special connee>
tion, in relation to the immunities accorded to representatives of States,
especially diplomatic representatives of one State accredited to another State
and personal sovereigns. The distinction has a clear function in determininl
the types of immunities that survive the mission of the accredited representatives or personal sovereigns and those that terminate with the end of their
mandates. The distinction is supported by the practice of States in regard to
the possibility of actions against ex-diplomats or ex-sovereigns.
Thus in Leon c. Diaz, Clunet 19 (1892), 1137, a former Minister of Uruguay
in France was held amenable to the jurisdiction c par la double raison qu.
Dial. a cessi ses fonctions diplomatiques en France depuis 1889, et qu'il s'agit,
dans son diffirend avec Leon, d'interlts absolument privu et entiermlmt
~trangers a ses fonctions de ministre IO. Similarly, in Laperdrix c. Kouzoubotf
et Belin, Clunet 53 (1926), page 64, an ex-Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Pari.
was ordered to pay an indemnity for injury caused to two persons in a car
accident. The action was brought three weeks after the cessation of hit
diplomatic functions in France in respect of an accident which occurred duriDI
his mission. The court observed: (at page 6S)
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«Cons. que Ie principe de l'immunit~ diplomatique ~rig~ dans
l'interit des gouvernements, et non dans celui des diplomates, ne
s'etend pas au-dela de la mission; que la these contraire aboutirait
a creer au profit de l'agent diplomatique une sorte de prescription et
une i"esponsabilite indetinie. 10
The practice of other States, such as Swiss (see Clunet 54 [1927], 1175 and
983-987, and also 1179), British (see Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin
[1859], 2 E. & E. 94, and Re Suarez, Suarez v. Suarez [1917] 2 Ch. 131, 139,
[1918] 1 Ch. 176) and American (see District of Columbia v. Paris (1939), Cases
Nos. 448485-448494, M.S. Dept. St. File 701.9411/1194 regarding an ex-employee of
the Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.A.) also confirms this trend.
Article 14 of the Resolutions of the Institut de Droit International (1895) and
Article 20 of the Havana Convention (1928) contain similar provisions. The
Harvard Draft Convention and the Draft of the Inter-American Institute of
International Law also contain virtually the same provisions. Article 39 (2) of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, provides:

.. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall
normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on
expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall submit
until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect
to the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity
shall continue to subsist• ..
Thus immunities accorded to diplomats ratione personae terminate with
their diplomatic functions, whereas immunities accorded ratione materiae
continue to subsist, being, as it were, immunities of the States they represent.
The same distinction applies to acts of personal sovereigns or heads of
State. Thus, in Empereur Maximilien du Mexique c. Lemaitre, Clunet 1 (1874),
32, immunity was upheld on the ground that the Emperor was the reigning
IOvereign in an action relating to the purchase of furniture for the decoration
of his residence without payment. On the other hand, in Mellerio c. Isabelle
de Bourbon, Clunet 1 (1874), 33, the court assumed jurisdiction on the grounds:
(1) that the defendant, formerly Queen of Spain no longer retained that public
office, and (2) that the order of jewels was for her own personal use (ratione
personae) and not c pour Ie compte du Tresor IO. The distinction between a
• prince regnant. and an • ancien sultan,. was maintained in the case of
Wiercinsky c. Seyyid Ali Ben Hamond, Prince Bashid, ex-Sultan of Zanzibar
in respect of unpaid personal service of massage rendered by the plaintiff.
Immunities enjoyed by diplomats and sovereigns ratione personae end with
the cessation of their official functions, but the immunities accorded to them
ratione materiae in the exercise of their functions continue to subsist. But the
continued subsistance of immunities ratione materiae merely signified that they
SUbsist as State immunities, and are therefore treated as such. Thus in the
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Iran Embassy case as well as the Philippines Embassy's Bank Account cue,
the immunities invoked are immunities ratione materiae, the question raised
concerns the precise extent of such State immunities which may also be
restricted as in the Italian case of La Mercantile c. Regno di Grecia, Tribunale
di Roma, 30-1-1955, Rivista di diritto internazionale 38 (1955), pp. 376-378, I.L.lt
1955, pp. 24().242.
The . distinction between immunities ratione personae and immunities
ratione materiae, which is useful in separating acts of representatives of Stalea
which are protected by States immunities ratione materiae and those which
are only entitled to a temporary protection during the terms of office, IJ
without use with regard to acts attributable to the States which are immune
in any event ratione materiae. Continued reference to the expression might
confuse jurisdictional immunities rationae materiae, i.e., State immunities with
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and "non-justiceability" of the proceedinp
under the lex fori.
The expression immunities in personam is not accurately phrased since It
is more in contradiction to immunity in rem, while the phrase "ratione mat.
riae" is to be contrasted with "ratione personae" with the special function of
distinguishing between acts performed by State representatives on behalf of
the States in the exercice of official functions and acts performed in their
individual personal capacity unconnected with any official duty.
3. This is a fundamental question, meaningful perhaps in the common Jaw
jurisdictions, where the court may first have to establish the existence of itl
jurisdiction and then decide whether or not to exercise it. Thus, an English
or American court would have the discretion to exercise or to decline to
exercise jurisdiction on several grounds, including those other than State immunity, such for instance, as an act of State, non-justiceability, lack of personal
jurisdiction, absence of subject-matter jurisdiction, or the existence of a better
forum conveniens or other grounds recognized in private international law.
The practice of civil-law jurisdiction may be more compelling with lela
discretion. Thus, once the court decides that it is «compitente., it cannot
decline jurisdiction. It has to determine the question submitted to it for
decision. This is one of the problem areas in which Professor Niboyet hal
endeavoured to draw a line of distinction between «immuniti de luridicticm»
which is public international law and c incompitence d'attribution. which IJ
probably private international law reasoning.
The answer to question No. 3 therefore depends on the judicial system or
the court of the country called upon to decide a given case. It cannot be
stated categorically in advance that the court in general or a particular court
can or cannot be given a discretion in according or withholding immunity.
Such a discretion may in tum depend on the judgement or opinion of the
court regarding the nature of the acts attributable to the foreign State.
4. The examples given in paragraph 18 provide excellent illustrations ci
apparent absence of legal basis for jurisdiction or reluctance on the part ci
municipal courts to examine cases in which under the rules of private iDter'-
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IIIlttonal law they are without jurisdiction or for lack of essential competence,
or subject-matter jurisdiction or remoteness of territorial connection or other
IJOWlds of non-justiceability under private or public international law. They
are to be distinguished from areas where the courts are otherwise competent
or have a valid ground on which to base jurisdiction under national law but
refrain from exercising it on grounds of State immunity as required by public
International law.
5. The principle of consent has a decisive role in relation to State immunity.
It is possible to regard the question of State immunity as arising as the result
of an interplay of a series of presumptions of consent, consent on the part of
the host State to allow the passage of foreign troops for instance, or consent
on the part of the sending State for its representatives to be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the territorial courts when instituting legal proceedings in those
courts. Consent has also been used to determine the possibility or the very
existence or claimworthiness of State immunity, as immunity presupposes lack
of consent on the part of the State claiming it. As such, immunity is never
absolute, but always relative and can be waived by the State at any time or
any stage of the proceeding. The question whether or not immunity will be
pnted or withheld in a given case may well depend on the readiness or
reluctance with which the court will presume or assume or imply the existence
of consent. On the other hand, immunity may also depend on the rigidity
or strictness of requirements regarding the procedure of claiming immunity.
Thus, immunity may be denied or presumed to have been waived, if no one
bas claimed it, or it may be denied if not properly claimed, such as by someone
DOt recognized by the court as representing the State concerned.
Consent may be implied from the conduct of the State, and the readiness
the part of the local law to imply consent may reflect the degree of
restriction municipal courts are prepared to place on the application of State
Immunities. It may provide a convenient common ground for a compromise
to be worked out so as to give satisfaction to the various theories and schools
01 thought regarding the desirable optimum extent of sustainable jurisdictional
immunities of States in international relations having regard to the co-existence
of different ideologies, forms of government and economic structures.

011

6. The Commission's task would be incomplete without reference to the
question of II heads of State and ministers of foreign governments ". Precisely
how far the Commission should treat various aspects of the immunities
ICCOrded and enjoyed by heads of States as State organs, and ministers as
departments of government, is a matter to be carefully examined and accurately measured. There are other questions involved, such as immunities ratione
personae during the tenure of their office, and immunities ratione materiae
which survive their official functions, but which are equally subject to whatever
restrictions that may be adopted to limit the application of State immunities
par excellence. The question referred to in question No. 6 could be treated
1IIIder the heading of State organs, departments of government, or agencies
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and instrumentaUties of States entitled to Immunity. They are included on the

list of recipients or beneficiaries of State immunities, of which the questioa
of precise extent should merit the attention of the Commission.
7... Foreign armed forces" can be subsumed under the heading of State
organs. Their immunities depend on the extent of consent of the receivinl
State as well as of the sending State. Foreign armed forces constitute organa
of the foreign States and are treated as such. The practice of States regardilll
the immunities of visiting foreign forces in time of peace is abundant. While
the immunities accorded to foreign visiting forces or men of war are subsumed
under other general categories of State immunities such as State organs, they
nevertheless deserve special attention. The emphasis in this connection should
be placed not so much on the granting or denial of immunities, but rather
on the division or partition or priorities of the exercise of concurrent JuriJ.
diction. Competition should be properly balanced between the exercise 01
disciplinary or supervisory military jurisdiction of the visiting forces and due
process of the local criminal law. In actual practice, there are no hard.and-fut
rules save the existence of concurrent jurisdiction that must be carefully
partitioned and adjusted so as to achieve a healthy balance between variOUl
conflicting interests of the territorial States and the sending States. Several
bilateral status of forces agreements and regional collective defence treaties
may provide revealing examples of possible cooperation between the authorities exercising concurrent jurisdiction. But the matter is delicate and susc:epo
tible of high sensitivity and popular emotion, especially in areas where foreigD
bases have been established. This is a trans-ideological problem whether ill
NATO alliance or in Warsaw pact, it has to be handled with extreme cautiaD.
8. In as much as the extent of immunity may be said to reflect policJ
considerations regarding the rationale or justification of State immunity, a
serious attempt to determine the precise scope or limit of immunity must 01
necessity take into account policy considerations underlying the concept 01
immunity. If indeed Immunity is a general principle of international Jaw, a
more fundamental principle is to be found in the concept of sovereignty and
equality of States on which immunity is based. Yet more basic than s0vereignty is the principle of territoriality to which immunity is but an accepted
exception. Doctrinal approach varies considerably with the policy considerations,
especially now the controversy is further complicated by the growing voice 01
the third world of developing nations. It would be a grave error to overlook
or underestimate the cries of the overwhelming majority of States simply
because they were neither European nor Socialist, or because their attitude
and approach may be basically different from the West or the East. Whatever
principles of international law to be developed, the courts should take iIlto
account the relevant interests of all States and the policy considerations of aD
nations, whose dignity or existence may depend on the general recognition of
an optimum volume or measure of State immunity. The nature test is bask:
but not always conclusive. In appropriate instances the purpose test may be
determinative.
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9. The formulation of immunity as a general principle is justifiable as long
u it is recognized that in relation to a more basic concept of territoriality
or territorial sovereignty, immunity itself is an exception to the more general
and fundamental rule of jurisdiction of the territorial State. It is on the basis
of implied waiver of jurisdiction or consent of the territorial State that immunity has come to be regarded as a general rule and in that context can be so
formulated. Another approach has also been suggested that there are two
equally valid general rules: one of jurisdiction and another of immunity, and
that each one constitutes an exception to the other. The exercise of jurisdiction is not infrequent in practice in well-defined areas of non-immunity.
It might be possible to work out areas of immunity at the same time as areas
of non-immunity on an equal basis. This approach has not been adopted in
effect, as State practice as well as codification efforts have started from the
proposition of immunity being a general rule and non-Immunity in specified
areas being its acknowledged exceptions.
10. While the practice of many States such as the United States, Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and to some extent also the
United Kingdom and France recognize the distinction between acts lure imperii
IDd acts jure gestionis, the practice of other countries such as Italy, Belgium
and Egypt probably accepted a more fundamental distinction between the
public and private character of State acts or between the public and private
capacity or personality of State. On the other hand, in socialist jurisdictions
all activities attributable to the State are public. Apart from being objeotionable in the eyes of many legal systems, the distinction is also unsuitable
u a basis for the development of international law, as it is unworkable in
practice and admits of considerable loopholes. It may even be considered
arbitrary and lead to injustices or inconsistent results.
II. The Rapporteur's" preferred solution" offers an interesting possibility
ill theory but appears to be far removed from the existing State practice. If
the Jaw of State immunity is empirical, an inductive approach is to be preferred.
The Rapporteur's suggestion merits closer attention with regard to the existence
01 criteria and not the application of a single criterion for determining immunity or non-immunity. None of the illustrations or examples furnished by the
Rapporteur readily commend themselves to any generally acceptable solutions.
Indeed, the jurisprudence or case law of several States has come up with
different answers, different solutions and different results, depending on the
criteria employed. The two principal distinctions proposed by the Rapporteur
could be helpful.
The first is similar to Professor Niboyet's distinction
between «immunite de juridiction,. and «incompetence d'attribution,., now
IDcompetence ration~ materiae or lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
IeCOnd distinction between the essence of national policies and the normal
rub of implementation by means of private law transaction may attract some
IUpport from developing countries if priority is accorded to their national

JIOlIcies.
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12.· My " preferred solution" is one based on an inductive approach,
wherever possible on existing State practice, or on current trends in the PI'llC>
tice of States. This is possible if acts attributable to States to which legal
proceedings relate may be classified into specified areas. In each of these
areas particular attention should be paid to the types of criteria that could be
adopted for distinguiShing elements giving rise to immunity from those givm,
rise to non-immunity.
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c:ountrles on administrative authorities or executive agencies other than the
judiciary or even the «police judiciaire,.. Such enforcement measures should
be ordered or authorized by the courts.
15. I do not disagree with the Rapporteur's provisional view that the immunity II from execution II is essentially the same immunity as that II from jurisdiction
Indeed both are covered by the expression jurisdictional immunities.
However, I beg to differ as regards considerations of principle and policy that
are not necessarily identical in both cases. Consent to be sued is separate
from and cannot be identified with consent to measures of execution. In fact,
consent to execution per se is inadequate to allow enforcement measure to
proceed. There must also be clearly identifiable assets or property against
which execution is leviable with the consent of the foreign State. Here,
opinions of government may differ as to the sacrosanctity or unattachability
of certain types of public property such as military aircraft, man-of-war or
military installations and facilities, funds of the central bank, which lie beyond
the power of the territorial State to seize or detain, some say by presumption,
others even by consent.
To protect the interest of developing countries
qainst the new frontier of enforcement measures which have recently been
Idopted by the courts of highly advanced countries a rule of law is being
progressively developed in the direction of prohibiting seizure or attachment
of several types of State property, at any rate without the clear and unequivocal
consent of the State. If it relates to permanent sovereignty over natural
resources, even such consent may be insufficient.
fl.

13. It is understandable that the RaPPOrteur's treatment of non<antractuaI
aspects finds justification in the existing dichotomy of the common Jaw
between contract and tort. In civil law and Roman law treatment of obligations and things, non<antractual aspects are simply too broad a perspective
to be placed under one single category. The Rapporteur has referred to variOUl
specified areas such as the right to property, the use of property, the protection of industrial property, personal injury, damage to property, succession
to property and trust. The broad spectrum of .. non-contractual aspects II
not inaccurate but may tend to reduce the significance or true value of other
branches of the law, such as State responsibility, international liability, capacity to acquire property rights, etc. It is therefore at best inadequate to
Indicate a wide variety of residual areas outside the realm of contractuaI
aspects.
II

14. There may be more than one discussion of the distinction between
immunity from juriSdiction and immunity from measures of enforcement.
There is to begin with the time dimension in which the question of immunity from jurisdiction must first be settled not only in the negative but also
positively in the fonn of judgement debt or award before any question of
measure of execution could be considered. In the second place, enforcement
measure by way of execution presupposes the existence of property, movable
or immovable within the jurisdiction of the State of the forum. Execution can
only be levied against such property. Other enforcement measures such as
specific perfonnance or injunction are not likely to be imposed as they seem
inappropriate or unenforceable against a foreign State.
Whatever the nature of distinction between immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from execution, the two immunities represent two succeedinl
phases in the legal Proceedings. This does not preclude the possibility of
seizure or attachment of property ad fundandam jurisdictionem or other typeS
of sequestration or freezing of assets as security measures, which constitute
pre-trial enforcement measures from which State immunity may also be
invoked. Thus waiver of immunity from execution is also possible but as •
separate act from waiver of immunity from jurisdiction.
Immunity from adjudication is immunity from the jurisdiction to adjudicate
It is an ordinary meaning ascribed to jurisdictional immunity, which in Its
extended interpretation also covers immunity from the jurisdiction to seize or
attach property as security or in execution of a judgement. The authority or
agencies empowered to adjudicate are inVariably the judges or the courts 01'
judicial authority, whereas the power to execute may be conferred in varIouS

16. I would not approach the problem of general accounts as presented
In the Philippines Embassy Case in the same manner as was adopted by the
United States Court in the Tanzania Embassy Case, which resulted in the
Interruption of the nonnal diplomatic relations, a decision which should be
left to the discretion of the political branch of the government. A mixed
account or general accounts of an embassy should never in any circumstances
be presumed or construed to serve as deposit of payment to service future or
pending adjudged debts. Too facile a presumption or imputation of consent
would make a mockery of international law if not indeed of natural justice.
National courts should not be tempted to perfonn miracles in areas where
even international tribunals dare not enter. In the absence of practical measures of enforcement against States in the international legal order, it would
Ieenl premature to suggest that municipal courts could enforce payments of
debts or perfonnance of an obligation by a foreign State.
17. My opinion of the provisions of Article III of the I.LA. Draft Convention
dted in question No. 17 is consequential on my reply to the previous question.
II it possible for municipal courts of a State to arrogate to themselves the
SlOWer to decide questions of legality of a nationalization decree or the taking
of property in violation of international law? How far can such unilateral
decision have any effect in international relations; particularly, should the State
of the forum assume the role of a judex in sua causa? There appear to be
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countless considerations that militate against such a proposal. True It may be
that it is about time some responsibility was assigned to national authoritiea
of a State, but assuredly this is not an area where national adjudicatioD or
enforcement could pave the way to international cooperation. Consent Is the
key to the solution of aU pertinent questions. Without consent no enforcement
measure should be encouraged, nor should consent ever be lightly Presumed
or implied, when it comes to seizing or freezing or attaching property of a
foreign State. The exception of property or assets earmarked for servicina
of contractual debts or obligations arising out of commercial transactiODl
should not be confused with property taken, whether or not there is or can
ever be property taken in violation of international law, which surely belonp
to a different chapter of international law. It should give no grounds for
municipal courts unilaterally to purport to redress an alleged internationally
wrongful act. Such a mandate should be reserved for international instances.
Judicial, arbitral, conciliatory or otherwise.

18. My view conforms with the general practice of States on the status 01
poHtical subdivisions, including constituent units of federal States, and State
instrumentalities. Political subdivisions may directly enjoy State lmmunitiea
in their own names if so provided in the constituent instrument establishina
the confederation, such as Switzerland and Brazil. Otherwise, they could act
as organs of the government entitled to State immunity. The expression "State
instrumentalities" is not new in American constitutional history, but difficult
of translation into other European or Asian languages to be sufficiently
meaningful. Do instrumentalities include warships, spacecraft, naval base, military installations and embassy premises as well as other "instrumentlUfl
legati "? If so, should the immunity accorded be one relating to the State u
an international person or more precisely to the instrumentality as State property rather than State organ or reprensentative of State? These are separate
questions that require distinct clarifications. Political subdivisions are State
organs or agencies rather than instrumentalities of government.
19. I do not consider the separate incorporation of an entity as a 1epl
person under municipal law to be automatically conclusive of the intent of the
State to waive or renounce immunity. On the contrary, many States give legal
personalities to their ministries and departments of government to provide
them with necessary legal capacity to sue and be sued in their own courts.
But when it comes to proceedings before the courts of another State, the
capacity to sue and be sued still persists subject to the claim of State immunity. It should be stated, however, that in the practice of some States, such
as the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, trading corporations are
established precisely to engage in external commercial operations with ciear
provision also in bilateral treaties waiving immunities in no uncertain termJ,
not only immunity from jurisdiction but also from execution, by allocatiDi or
setting aside bank accounts or assets for that very purpose. Yet in practice
private litigants were not content with the solution so generously offered but

Jurisdictional immunity of States

151

Itill sought to proceed directly against the foreign State eo nomine, hence the
IOIlJ'ce of unnecessary misgivings. (See the Qureshi's Case in Pakistan Supreme
Court.)

20. N.B.

A4ditional Comments:
One of the most recent aspects of jurisdictional immunities is the law suit
crisis now very current in the U.S.A., the U.K. and other industrially advanced
countries. The cost of a law suit may be so exhorbitant and so prohibitive
that to establish State or sovereign immunity alone may cost more than the
total value of the claim against the foreign State.
(See, e.g., Document
No. AALCC/IM/83/1 Asian-African legal Consultative Committee, Meeting of
LepI Advisers, New York, November 1983; and the House of Lords Judgment
In Alcom Limited v. Colombia et AI. [1984] A.C. where Lord Dipplock said at
page 725. regarding the cost incurred in the garnishee proceedings for the bank
ICCOUDt of the Embassy of Colombia in London: "Those, to the discredit of
our legal system, Your Lordships were told, already exceeded the amount of
the judgment debt even be/ore the appeal reached this House. '')
Sompong Sucharit1cul

9. Observations of Mr Yuichi Takano
Tokyo, July 1983

&etion 1.
State Immunity has lately attracted considerable attention from the Interaational community.
The main cause for this concern is deemed to be
increasing opportunities for Nation States to participate in economic and com·
mercial activities.
States have traditionally been subjects of diplomatic, political and military
relations on the international plane. Such relationships between States are in
principle authoritative by nature, based on international agreements, or inter·
national law in general. However, when States appear on the international
ltage of economic and commercial activities, they are not necessarily acting as
authoritative subjects, nor upon the basis of international agreements or international law in general. States today are known to frequently form economic
and commercial relations in the same manner as private individuals or organi·
zations and act on the contractual or municipal private law basis.
When problems arise during the course of such State activities in the ecoDOmic and commercial fields within the territory of other sovereign States, the
question is raised whether States are subject to the jurisdiction of those terri-

